The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism

Philosophy of Science 73 (3):277-297 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991; Dawkins 1982) defend the weaker view that in many cases there are multiple equally adequate accounts of evolutionary events, but that always among the set of equally adequate representations will be one at the genic level. We describe a range of cases all involving stable equilibria actively maintained by selection. In these cases genotypic models correctly show that selection is active at the equilibrium point. In contrast, the genic models have selection disappearing at equilibrium. For deterministic models this difference makes no difference. However, once drift is added in, the two sets of models diverge in their predicted evolutionary trajectories. Thus, contrary to received wisdom on this matter, the two sets of models are not empirically equivalent. Moreover, the genic models get the facts wrong.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why the Gene will not return.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):287-310.
Evolution without change in Gene frequencies.David Magnus - 1998 - Biology and Philosophy 13 (2):255-261.
Teleogy and genes.Nicholas Agar - 1996 - Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):289-300.
Reply to Rosenberg on genic selectionism.Elliott Sober & Richard C. Lewontin - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):648-650.
The Dimensions of Selection.Peter Godfrey-Smith & Richard Lewontin - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (3):373-395.
The “averaging fallacy” and the levels of selection.Samir Okasha - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):167-184.
Artifact, cause and genic selection.Elliott Sober & Richard C. Lewontin - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (2):157-180.
Species selection on variability.Elisabeth A. Lloyd & Gould Stephen J. - 1993 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 90:595-599.
Tempered realism about the force of selection.C. Kenneth Waters - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):553-573.
Contextual unanimity and the units of selection problem.Stuart Glennan - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):118-137.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
152 (#120,974)

6 months
43 (#89,629)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Brandon
Duke University

References found in this work

Artifact, cause and genic selection.Elliott Sober & Richard C. Lewontin - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (2):157-180.
The Return of the Gene.Kim Sterelny & Philip Kitcher - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):339.
Précis of Unto Others.David Sloan Wilson & Elliott Sober - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):681-684.

View all 17 references / Add more references