Abstract

The essays gathered here are guided by the need to eliminate from the hermeneutic theory any idealistic and transcendental remnants, under the assumption of the historicity and practicality of the experience of meaning. What is tested is the double hypothesis that the concept of meaning, having and making sense of something, act, object or situation, is based primarily on acting and not feeling, and that this concept does not imply that what makes and has sense is linguistic or sign. For this, I distanced myself from some theses characteristic of the hermeneutic philosophical tradition, although with this departure I wanted, a contrario, to reinforce and explain the hermeneutic character of our experiences and actions. In the firelight lit by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, I assume the effective agency and the effectiveness of the effects of things done as the only basis for the experience of meaning: the scope of meaning is made up in the field of action of situated active (inter) agents.