Rejecting Internalism

Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara (1998)
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Abstract

Internalism is the view that the truth of normative propositions depends solely upon elements which are internal to subjects. In this dissertation I argue that we should reject the primary rationale for taking an internalist line in various areas of normative assessment, namely a principle known as the Internalism Requirement. In the first part of the dissertation I focus on epistemology, and argue that we should reject the internalism requirement on epistemic reasons, i.e., the claim that reasons for believing must be such that agents will believe for those reasons, at least insofar as they are rational. In the process of making this argument, I indicate why particular internalist positions in the epistemic realm--internalism about justification and internalism about reasons--ought to be rejected. The second part of my thesis focuses on rejecting the internalism requirement as applied to practical reasons, i.e., the claim that reasons for acting must be such as to motivate rational agents. The arguments here take the form of showing how, on any plausible theory of practical reasons, there will be considerations which fail to motivate rational agents. Again, my arguments indicate why we should also reject particular internalist views in the practical sphere. I conclude the dissertation with remarks indicating how rejection of the internalism requirement on practical reasons affects normative moral theory

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Michael S. Brady
University of Glasgow

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