Painfulness, Desire, and the Euthyphro Dilemma

American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):239-250 (2018)

Authors
Michael S. Brady
University of Glasgow
Abstract
The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new view maintains that painfulness is a property, not of pain sensations, but of a pain experience, understood as a relational state constituted by a pain sensation and a desire that the sensation not be occurring.
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
Can Evaluativism About Unpleasant Pains Meet the Normative Condition?Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):779-802.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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