Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2019)

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Seamus Bradley
London School of Economics (PhD)
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.

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