Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):219-223 (2018)

Nick Brancazio
University of Wollongong
Feminist philosophers of science have long discussed the importance of taking situatedness into account in scientific practices to avoid erasing important aspects of lived experience. Through the example of Gillian Einstein’s [2012] situated neuroscience, I will add support to Gallagher’s [2019] claims that intertheoretic reduction is problematic and provide reason to think pluralistic methodologies are explanatorily and ethically preferable.
Keywords situated neuroscience  enactivism  feminist philosophy of science  feminist philosophy of mind
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552101
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Rethinking Again.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):234-245.

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