A New Look at the Prime Mover

Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (1):1-22 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A New Look at the Prime MoverDavid BradshawThe last twenty years have seen a notable shift in scholarly views on the Prime Mover. Once widely dismissed as a relic of Aristotle's early Platonism, the Prime Mover is coming increasingly to be seen as a key—perhaps the key—to Aristotle's mature metaphysics and philosophy of mind. Perhaps the best example of the revisionist view is Jonathan Lear's Aristotle: The Desire to Understand. Lear describes Aristotle's position as a form of "objective idealism." It is idealism because Aristotle believes that the fundamental nature of reality conforms to the mind, rather than vice versa; it is objective because the mind to which reality conforms is not that of any particular thinking being, but the divine mind—that is, in a sense, mind itself. "Objects must conform to knowledge, but that does not in the least reveal them to be constituted by any contribution from us... Since, for Aristotle, there is nothing distinctively human about the mind to which objects are conforming, there is no basis for saying that the essences we contemplate are mere appearances."1 Although it may seem strange to think of Aristotle as an idealist, Lear makes a plausible case for his interpretation based on the relevant texts (primarily De Anima III.4 and Metaphysics XII.6-10), and he successfully integrates it into his treatment of other important themes in Aristotle's philosophy.Attempts such as Lear's to tease out the significance of divine thinking are not the only new development afoot. Whereas Lear seems to accept the traditional view that the Prime Mover is a final but not an efficient cause, others such as Thomas de Koninck and Sarah Broadie have challenged that view.2 They have successfully shown, in my opinion, that Aristotle's position requires [End Page 1] that the Prime Mover be in some fashion an efficient cause. But they have not successfully elucidated the nature of this causality, nor have they explained how it is related to the theme rightly given prominence by Lear, the creative character of divine thought.My purpose here is to bring these two strands together—to use an interpretation of divine thinking much like Lear's to illuminate Aristotle's otherwise vexing and obscure remarks about the Prime Mover's causality. Rather than follow the time-honored route of commenting upon the commentators, I will examine the whole issue afresh, working in roughly the order dictated by Aristotle's text. My hope is to present a comprehensive interpretation of the Prime Mover that is more compelling than any yet offered by either the revisionists or their critics.1. Activity and Actuality in Metaphysics XIIMetaphysics XII.6 begins with a terse argument for the existence of a first unmoved mover. In the course of this argument Aristotle drops some important clues about the nature of the Prime Mover and its relation to the cosmos.The argument runs as follows: (1) Time cannot come into being or pass away, for that would involve the paradox of a moment before time or a moment after time. (2) Given Aristotle's own definition of time as "the number of motion in respect of before and after," or any other definition linking time inseparably to motion, motion also cannot come into being or pass away, and so must be continuous. (3) There must be a mover to cause this continuous motion. (4) The mover cannot merely be something capable of causing the motion, but must actively do so (, 1071b17). (5) Even for the mover to act continually is not sufficient if its substance includes potency or is potency (, 1071b18), for then the mover could possibly not be, and so could not guarantee an eternal motion. (6) Therefore the very substance of the mover must be actuality (, 1071b20). In the next sentence Aristotle goes on to speak as if there might be more than one mover, noting that "these substances must be without matter, for they must be eternal, if anything is eternal" (1071b20-22). After this nothing more is said about the possibility of more than one mover until chapter XII.8.There is an...

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bounding Prime Models.Barbara F. Csima, Denis R. Hirschfeldt, Julia F. Knight & Robert I. Soare - 2004 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 69 (4):1117 - 1142.
The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle's Cosmology.Mohan Matthen - 2001 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 20:171-199.
Moral Virtue, Eudaimonia, and The Prime Mover.Dolores Miller - 1986 - New Scholasticism 60 (1):1-34.
Falsehood as the Prime Mover of Hermeneutics.Thomas M. Seebohm - 1992 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6 (1):1 - 24.
The Prime Mover and the Order of Learning.Ralph Mclnerny - 1956 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 30:129-137.
The Prime Mover in Philosophy of Nature and in Metaphysics.Vincent E. Smith - 1954 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 28:78-94.
In What Sense Is the Prime Mover Eternal?David Bradshaw - 1997 - Ancient Philosophy 17 (2):359-369.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
551 (#31,578)

6 months
25 (#111,691)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Bradshaw
University of Kentucky

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references