Ampère et Duhem : classification naturelle et engagements ontologiques

Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 3 (1):69-78 (2016)
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Abstract

Duhem is known for his criticism of induction and especially of the way Ampère pretends founding electrodynamics. Despite this criticism, they share philosophical commitments: an attempt to destroy essentialism, a renewal of the link between metaphysics and physics, the use of the concept of “natural classification”. Thanks to this concept of “natural classification”, they are both led to a similar structural realism. In their opinion, if metaphysics should not determine physics, there is still room for it. Actually, the hope of a progress toward a natural classification expressing truth may imply – in Duhem’s and Ampère’s works – a kind of providentialism.

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