Adams conditionals and non-monotonic probabilities

Abstract

Adams' famous thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities is incompatible with standard probability theory. Indeed it is incompatible with any system of monotonic conditional probability satisfying the usual multiplication rule for conditional probabilities. This paper explores the possibility of accommodating Adams' thesis in systems of non-monotonic probability of varying strength. It shows that such systems impose many familiar lattice theoretic properties on their models as well as yielding interesting logics of conditionals, but that a standard complementation operation cannot be defined within them, on pain of collapsing probability into bivalence.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,660

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
96 (#124,786)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Similar books and articles

Conditionals, Probability, and Nontriviality.Charles G. Morgan & Edwin D. Mares - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (5):455-467.
Indicative Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
Probability and Conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Conditioning Against the Grain.Stefan Kaufmann - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):583-606.
Modus Tollens Probabilized.Carl G. Wagner - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):747-753.
More Triviality.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.

Author's Profile

Richard Bradley
London School of Economics

References found in this work

Indicative Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.

View all 14 references / Add more references