Die Spontaneität des Verstandes bei Kant und einigen Neokantianern

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 63 (4) (2015)
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Abstract

Kant famously characterizes our human understanding as a “spontaneous” faculty, but what can this mean? I criticize some recent interpretations of Kant’s claim and suggest that we can only understand what Kant means by “the spontaneity of understanding” if we recognize certain basic differences between how Kant conceived of cognition and how philosophers commonly think of it today. I go on to argue that Kant’s conception of cognition represents an appealing alternative to the unsatisfying options that contemporary ways of thinking seem to force on us.

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Matthew Boyle
University of Chicago

Citations of this work

Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.
Belief as an act of reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.

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References found in this work

Understanding and sensibility.Stephen Engstrom - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):2 – 25.
Sensibility and Understanding.S. Engstrorn - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):2-25.

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