Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):455-474 (2015)
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Abstract |
The aim of this paper is to motivate the need for and then present the outline of an alternative explanation of what Dan Zahavi has dubbed “open intersubjectivity,” which captures the basic interpersonal character of perceptual experience as such. This is a notion whose roots lay in Husserl’s phenomenology. Accordingly, the paper begins by situating the notion of open intersubjectivity – as well as the broader idea of constituting intersubjectivity to which it belongs – within Husserl’s phenomenology as an approach distinct from his more well-known account of empathy in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. I then recapitulate and criticize Zahavi’s phenomenological explanation of open intersubjectivity, arguing that his account hinges on a flawed phenomenology of perceptual experience. In the wake of that criticism, I supply an alternative phenomenological framework for explaining open intersubjectivity, appealing to the methodological principles of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and his theory of developmentally primitive affect. Those principles are put to work using the resources of recent studies of cognitive developmental and social cognition. From that literature, I discuss how infants learn about the world from others in secondary intersubjectivity through natural pedagogy. Lastly, the paper closes by showing how the discussion of infant development explains the phenomenon of open intersubjectivity and by highlighting the relatively moderate nature of this account compared to Zahavi’s
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Keywords | Intersubjectivity Intentionality Genetic phenomenology Edmund Husserl Affect Social cognition Natural pedagogy Secondary intersubjectivity |
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Reprint years | 2015 |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11097-014-9346-2 |
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References found in this work BETA
Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology.Mark Rowlands - 2010 - Bradford.
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Citations of this work BETA
Absent Aspects, Possible Perceptions and Open Intersubjectivity: A Critical Analysis of Dan Zahavi’s Account of Horizontal Intentionality.Gunnar Declerck - 2018 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 49 (4):321-341.
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