Philosophy of Science 69 (1):29-72 (2002)

Authors
Stephan Hartmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Luc Bovens
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
We appeal to the theory of Bayesian Networks to model different strategies for obtaining confirmation for a hypothesis from experimental test results provided by less than fully reliable instruments. In particular, we consider (i) repeated measurements of a single test consequence of the hypothesis, (ii) measurements of multiple test consequences of the hypothesis, (iii) theoretical support for the reliability of the instrument, and (iv) calibration procedures. We evaluate these strategies on their relative merits under idealized conditions and show some surprising repercussions on the variety-of-evidence thesis and the Duhem-Quine thesis.
Keywords Bayesianism   Philosophy of Science   Reliabilism   Confirmation   Duhem-Quine
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Reprint years 2002
DOI 10.1086/338940
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Variety of Evidence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):183-223.

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