Abstract

Isaiah Berlin was the first in a now long line of scholars to defend and provide argument for the affinity between two seemingly incompatible views, value pluralism and political liberalism. William Galston and George Crowder offer contemporary versions of the affinity argument, what I call the Berlin project. Critics of the Berlin project, including John Gray, Robert Talisse, and Matthew Moore, argue that the affinity argument is doomed to contradiction, as the incommensurable nature of values under pluralism cannot lend support to any particular value or set of values, including liberal ones. I propose to avoid this problem by distinguishing between two types of moral value, personal and political. Separating personal values from political makes clear important differences in application: Personal values apply to individuals and help to shape the lives we lead, while political values apply to polities and help to shape the societies we live in. I argue that the moral upshot of pluralism is a normative demand for political diversity only, applying at the level of polities not persons. And since political values are not incommensurable with personal values, the contradiction does not arise. I argue such a move avoids central criticisms of the Berlin project and provides proponents a path forward.