Beyond QBism with Ontology of Knowledge iss. 20211210

Philpapers (2021)
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Abstract

[issue 20211210] Qbism (quantum bayesism) is a philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) that places the agent and its expectations at the heart of theory. The QBists advocate a "subjectivist" interpretation of probabilities that allows to understand the quantum laws of Born and to eliminate certain enigmas of interpretation of the QM going "beyond" the interpretation of Copenhagen. The Ontology of Knowledge (OK) is in agreement with the main ideas of the Qbism. For the OdC indeed: -The agent is the focal point of the representation -Representation is specific to the agent -There are no "states of the world" but only "states of knowledge" -There is no probability of evolution of the "state of the world" but only probabilities, for the subject, of evolution of his Knowledge. -These probabilities lead to the future actions and experiences of the agent. The aim of this article is to propose, according to the OdC, ways for an extension of the explanatory power of the QBism.

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