Mellor on negative properties

Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):523-526 (1998)
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Abstract

DH Mellor has argued that there can be no negative, disjunctive, or conjunctive properties. This argument has been criticized by Alex Oliver on the grounds that it rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts, but it seems to me that a simpler criticism is available. According to this criticism, the problem with Mellor's argument is that it trades on an ambiguity in the semantics of the phrase "the fact that", according to which "the fact that" can be understood as creating either an intensional or an extensional context.

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Andrew Botterell
University of Western Ontario

Citations of this work

Against Conjunctive Properties.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (3):421-437.

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References found in this work

Could There Be Conjunctive Universals?Alex Oliver - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):88 - 97.
A note on physicalism and heat.Frank Jackson - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):26-34.

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