The KK Principle and the Strong Notion of Knowledge: Hintikka’s Arguments for KK Revisited

History and Philosophy of Logic:1-17 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In his Knowledge and Belief (1962), Hintikka establishes his system of epistemic logic with the KK (Knowing that One Knows, in symbols, Kp→KKp) principle (KK for short). However, his system of epistemic logic and the KK principle are grounded upon his strong notion of knowledge, which requires that knowledge is infallible, that is, it makes further inquiry pointless, and becomes ‘discussion-stopper’; knowledge implies truth, to wit, cognitive agents will not be mistaken in their knowledge; cognitive agents will be ‘perfect logicians’, i.e. they have infinitive capability of logical inference. Hintikka calls the argument for KK from the strong notion of knowledge as the ‘transcendental argument’ for KK. Obviously, the strong notion of knowledge is far away from our ordinary conception of knowledge; based on such a strong sense of knowledge, epistemic logic has met the problem of logical omnipotence, and is difficult to apply in our ordinary cognitive practice. Moreover, there is no close connection of the KK principle with internalism or externalism.

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Bo Chen
Wuhan University

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Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.
Could KK Be OK?Daniel Greco - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (4):169-197.

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