The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents [Book Review]

Minds and Machines 22 (2):71-85 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper discusses the relation between intelligence and motivation in artificial agents, developing and briefly arguing for two theses. The first, the orthogonality thesis, holds (with some caveats) that intelligence and final goals (purposes) are orthogonal axes along which possible artificial intellects can freely vary—more or less any level of intelligence could be combined with more or less any final goal. The second, the instrumental convergence thesis, holds that as long as they possess a sufficient level of intelligence, agents having any of a wide range of final goals will pursue similar intermediary goals because they have instrumental reasons to do so. In combination, the two theses help us understand the possible range of behavior of superintelligent agents, and they point to some potential dangers in building such an agent

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Instrumental rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:280-309.
The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality.Stephen Ellis - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):199-220.
Instrumental Rationality.Markos Valaris - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):443-462.
Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--36.
Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Instrumental desires, instrumental rationality.Edward Harcourt - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):111–129.
Humean motivation and Humean rationality.Mark van Roojen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (1):37-57.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-14

Downloads
313 (#62,184)

6 months
58 (#73,312)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nick Bostrom
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Against the singularity hypothesis.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
Robots, Law and the Retribution Gap.John Danaher - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (4):299–309.
Is it time for robot rights? Moral status in artificial entities.Vincent C. Müller - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):579–587.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The singularity: A philosophical analysis.David J. Chalmers - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):9 - 10.
On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.

View all 15 references / Add more references