The Doomsday Argument and the Self–Indication Assumption: Reply to Olum

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):83-91 (2003)
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Nick Bostrom
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Citations of this work

Philosophical Implications of Inflationary Cosmology.Joshua Knobe, Ken D. Olum & Alexander Vilenkin - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):47-67.
How to predict future duration from present age.Bradley Monton & Brian Kierland - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):16-38.
Self-location and Causal Context.Simon Friederich - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):232-258.

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