Ears are not the Subject of Hearing in Aristotle’s On the Soul II 8, 420a3–12

Philologus: Zeitschrift für Antike Literatur Und Ihre Rezeption 154 (2):171-186 (2010)
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Abstract

On the Soul II 8, 420a3–12 is always explained as if Aristotle there considered the ears to be the seat of the faculty of hearing. However, Aristotle there identifies the instrument of sense perception not with external parts of the visible body but with the soul’s instrumental body, situated in the heart and connected with the ears. That also appears to be the case in Generation of Animals V 2.

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10.1524/phil.2010.0016

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