Abstract

All speech is a form of self-presentation, a performance on the stage of life, and since antiquity this has been accepted as much as lamented and rejected on moral grounds. Do we today, once again, live in times that justify this complaint? So-called ‘fake news’ are, first and foremost, simply ‘news,’ that is, information whose truth claims everyone needs to judge according to their own prejudices. Nietzsche’s skepticism about truth, at least since the early essay Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne, draws radical conclusions from this apparently nihilistic diagnosis of our cognitive abilities which never reach their goal, that is, truth. But Nietzsche does not despair about the fact that our thinking has no power over truth; rather, he transforms lying into a product of the creative intellect that seeks to serve life. As such, we have to rethink truth’s relationship to lying. Both, truth and lying, thus lose their respective meaning. Against the background of Kant’s famous distinction between opining, believing, and knowing as three different modes of holding-to-be-true, I argue that Nietzsche does indeed provide a both timely and constructive answer to the question how to think about ‘lying.’