The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Erkenntnis 75 (1):37-43 (2011)
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Abstract

Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling the playing field. The burden of proof then lies with those who seek to deny Foley’s radical suggestion

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Anthony Booth
University of Sussex

Citations of this work

Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.

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References found in this work

Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.Richard Foley - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Why knowledge is merely true belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.
Truth as the Epistemic Goal.Marian David - 2001 - In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169.

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