The Cogent Reasoning Model of Informal Fallacies

Informal Logic 19 (1) (1999)
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Abstract

An infonnal fallacy is a reasoning error with three features: the reasoning employs an implicit cogent pattern; the fallacy results from one or more false premises; there is culpable ignorance or deception associated with the falsity of the premises. A reconstruction and analysis of the cogent reasoning patterns in fourteen standard infonnal fallacy types plus several variations are given. Defense of the CMR account covers: a general failure to apply the principle of charity in informal fallacy contexts; empirical evidence for it; how it explains Walton's point that there are both fallacious and non-fallacious instances of fallacy types; how it avoids most "relevance" problems, pennits clearer taxonomizing, and promises pedagogical advantages; how it solves a "demarcation problem."

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Citations of this work

Inference to the More Robust Explanation.Nicholaos Jones - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):75-102.
False Dilemma: A Systematic Exposition.Taeda Tomić - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (4):1-22.
Continental Philosophy of Science.Babette Babich - 2007 - In Constantin Boundas (ed.), The Edinburgh Companion to the Twentieth Century Philosophies. Edinburgh. University of Edinburgh Press. pp. 545--558.

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References found in this work

Logic and Conversation.H. P. Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (eds.), The Logic of Grammar. Encino, CA: pp. 64-75.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 47.
The Ad Baculum Re-Clothed.Alan Brinton - 1992 - Informal Logic 14 (2).
Knockdown Arguments.Michael Wreen - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (3):316-336.

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