Some Objections to Peels’ Combinatorial Analysis of Belief
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (4):605-611 (2018)
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References found in this work
Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology.Rik Peels - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):495-513.
