Synthese 187 (2):509-517 (2012)
AbstractTo be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral duties, for example. I show how this has the surprising result that, if deontologism is a thesis about doxastic justification, it entails that there is no such thing as epistemic or moral justification for a belief that p. I then suggest why this result, though controversial, may have some salutary consequences: primarily that it helps us make some sense of an otherwise puzzling situation regarding doxastic dilemmas.
Similar books and articles
Doxastic decisions and controlling belief.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.
Deontology in ethics and epistemology.Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):530-545.
Kant's ethics and duties to oneself.Lara Denis - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):321–348.
Duties to Oneself, Duties of Respect to Others.Allen W. Wood - 2009 - In Thomas E. Hill (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
Kant's Conception of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration.Lara Denis - 2000 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (4):405-23.
Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson's Libertarian Challenge.Pablo Gilabert - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):193-216.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia.Lisa Bortolotti - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):879-900.
An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.
The Ethics of Delusional Belief.Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):275-296.
References found in this work
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - Routledge.
Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.