Philosophia 36 (2):227-231 (2008)
AbstractShah, N. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 481–498 (2006) has defended evidentialism on the premise that only it (and not pragmatism) is consistent with both (a) the deliberative constraint on reasons and (b) the transparency feature of belief. I show, however, that the deliberative constraint on reasons is also problematic for evidentialism. I also suggest a way for pragmatism to be construed so as to make it consistent with both (a) and (b) and argue that a similar move is not available to the evidentialist. Thus, far from settling the debate in favour of evidentialism, considerations concerning the deliberative constraint on reasons support pragmatism.
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Citations of this work
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Epistemic Reasons, Transparency, and Evolutionary Debunking.Nicole Dular & Nikki Fortier - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1455-1473.
Defending Shah’s Evidentialism from his Pragmatist Critics: the Carnapian Link.Robert Hudson - 2016 - Contemporary Pragmatism 13 (2):143-168.
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Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Making up your mind: Self-interpretation and self-constitution.Richard Moran - 1988 - Ratio 1 (2):135-51.