In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998)
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Abstract

This book is concerned with the alleged capacity of the human mind to arrive at beliefs and knowledge about the world on the basis of pure reason without any dependence on sensory experience. Most recent philosophers reject the view and argue that all substantive knowledge must be sensory in origin. Laurence BonJour provocatively reopens the debate by presenting the most comprehensive exposition and defence of the rationalist view that a priori insight is a genuine basis for knowledge. This important book will be at the centre of debate about the theory of knowledge for many years to come.

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