Frege’s Puzzle and Cognitive Relationism: An Essay on Mental Files and Coordination

Disputatio 12 (56):1-40 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper will critically examine two solutions to Frege’s puzzle: the Millian-Russellian solution proposed by Salmon and Braun, which invokes non-semantic modes of presentation (guises, ways of believing or the like); and Fine’s relationalist solution, which appeals to semantic coordination. Special attention will be devoted to discussing the conception of modes of presentation as mental files and to elucidating the nature of coordination. A third solution to Frege’s puzzle will be explored which, like Salmon’s and Braun’s, adopts the Millian-Russellian semantics but, like Fine’s, involves coordination instead of modes of presentation; however, coordination will not be conceived as a semantic relation but as a cognitive and subjective relation, which provides no contribution to semantic content. This novel Millian-Russellian account involving cognitive coordination will be labelled cognitive relationism.

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Paolo Bonardi
University of Geneva

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References found in this work

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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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