Defaulting on Reasons

Noûs:229-259 (2018)
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10.1111/nous.12165

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Daniel Bonevac
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Citations of this work

Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Particularism for Generalists: A Rossian Business Ethic.J. Drake - 2021 - Business Ethics Quarterly 31 (4):600-622.
Free choice reasons.Daniel Bonevac - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):735-760.
Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Logic.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.

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