Belief revision in a temporal framework

In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press (2008)
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Abstract

The theory of belief revision deals with (rational) changes in beliefs in response to new information. In the literature a distinction has been drawn between belief revision and belief update (see [6]). The former deals with situations where the objective facts describing the world do not change (so that only the beliefs of the agent change over time), while the letter allows for situations where both the facts and the doxastic state of the agent change over time. We focus on belief revision and propose a temporal framework that allows for iterated revision. We model the notion of “minimal” or “conservative” belief revision by considering logics of increasing strength. We move from one logic to the next by adding one or more axioms and show that the corresponding logic captures more stringent notions of minimal belief revision. The strongest logic that we propose provides a full axiomatization of the well-known AGM theory of belief revision

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2009-01-28

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Giacomo Bonanno
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

AGM Belief Revision in Monotone Modal Logics.Gregory Wheeler - 2010 - LPAR 2010 Short Paper Proceedings.
Diversity of agents and their interaction.Fenrong Liu - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):23-53.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.

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