Subjective, Objective and “Realistic” Moral Responsibility

Abstract

As a common saying goes “Hell is paved with good intentions”, though Kant would disagree. In real world we may be morally responsible for more than one’s intentions. Moral agents need to navigate between Scylla of “objective” and Charybdis of “subjective” theories of moral responsibility; the resultant theory shall be called a theory of realistic obligation. It takes into account both subjective intentions and objective results of moral action. Since human beings are both intentional entities and physical objects, neglect of either objective or subjective factors leads to implausible consequences. In practical domains, such as business ethics, moral value needs to be assigned in part to our subjective intentions and in part to objective results of our actions. This allows for moral condemnation of inefficiency and balancing acts of efficiency versus deontic constraints.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-08

Downloads
5 (#1,213,140)

6 months
1 (#386,040)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter Boltuc
University of Illinois at Springfield

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Objective and Subjective Blame After War.Shannon Fyfe & Amy McKiernan - 2017 - Essays in Philosophy 18 (2):295-315.
Subjective Rightness.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.
An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Reasons.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):229-244.
Objective Morality, Subjective Morality, and the Explanatory Question.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3):1-25.
Subjective Action.Susanne Herrmann-Sinai - 2016 - In Susanne Herrmann-Sinai & Lucia Ziglioli (eds.), Hegel's Philosophical Psychology. Abingdon / New York: Routledge. pp. 127–152.
An Intentional Fallacy in Epistemology.Alan R. White - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):539 - 543.
Subjective Reasons.Eric Vogelstein - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):239-257.
Objective or Subjective 'Ought'?Sven Ove Hansson - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (1):33-35.
The Case Against Objective Values.Alan H. Goldman - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):507-524.
Practical Ethics and Moral Objectivism.Margarita M. Valdés - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:73-81.
Morality as Subjectness.Olga Zubets - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 12:357-360.