How the Tiger Bush Got Its Stripes: ‘How Possibly’ vs. ‘How Actually’Model Explanations

The Monist 97 (3):321-338 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Simulations using idealized numerical models can often generate behaviors or patterns that are visually very similar to the natural phenomenon being investigated and to be explained. The question arises, when should these model simulations be taken to provide an explanation for why the natural phenomena exhibit the patterns that they do? An important distinction for answering this question is that between ‘how-possibly’ explanations and ‘how-actually’ explanations. Despite the importance of this distinction there has been surprisingly little agreement over how exactly this distinction should bedrawn. I shall argue that inadequate attention has been paid to the different contexts in which an explanation can be given and the different levels of abstraction at which the explanandum phenomenon can be framed. By tracing how scientists are using model simulations to explain a striking periodic banding of vegetation known as tiger bush, I will show how our understanding of the distinction between how-possibly and how-actually model explanations needs to be revised.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How-possibly explanations in biology.David B. Resnik - 1991 - Acta Biotheoretica 39 (2):141-149.
Can classical structures explain quantum phenomena?Alisa Bokulich - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-235.
The role of dispositions in explanations.Agustín Vicente - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3):301-310.
How scientific models can explain.Alisa Bokulich - 2011 - Synthese 180 (1):33 - 45.
Contrastive Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:247-266.
When mechanistic models explain.Carl F. Craver - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):355-376.
Knowledge of counterfactual interventions through cognitive models of mechanisms.Jonathan Waskan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):259 – 275.
Non‐committal Causal Explanations.David Pineda - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170.
Models of intentional explanation.Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):233 – 246.
Dreaming in the multilevel framework.Katja Valli - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1084-1090.
Holistic explanations of events.Aviezer Tucker - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (4):573-589.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-28

Downloads
86 (#192,854)

6 months
10 (#251,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alisa Bokulich
Boston University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references