Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (4):559-578 (2010)

Gabriella Pigozzi
Université Paris Dauphine
In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from conditional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In this paper we consider the role of goals in reasoning about beliefs. Though we assume that goals do not play a role in the belief generation problem, we argue that they play a role in the belief selection problem. We show the rationality of the use of goals in belief selection, in the sense that there are cases in which agents that take their goals into account in selecting a belief set from a set of alternatives outperform agents that do not do so. We also formally distinguish between the rational role of goals in belief selection and irrational wishful thinking
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DOI 10.1093/jigpal/jzp038
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