Chaos and determinism: Prediction and anticipation – a conceptual distinction

Studia Philosophica 1 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Today, it is difficult to find much unanimity in what is “the prediction”. New mathematical theories offer the support for an epistemological investigation of predictability. Chaos breaks across the lines that separate the scientific predictions. Chaos poses new conceptual problems in philosophy. Prediction and Anticipation is a conceptual distinction between numerical predictions and geometrical `predictions`. Anticipation means to see what kind of theoretical picture one could develop. Conceptual analysis on a philosophical level is an operational way to clarify the so called ‘deterministic chaos`

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The anticipation of crisis. An application of chaos theory.Manuel Hennessey - 2007 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 7:128-159.
Chaos, prediction and laplacean determinism.M. A. Stone - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (2):123--31.
Philosophical Aspects of Chaos Theory.Stephen Hugh Kellert - 1990 - Dissertation, Northwestern University
Deterministisches chaos: Einige wissenschaftstheoretisch interessante aspekte. [REVIEW]Klaus Jürgen Düsberg - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):11 - 24.
Determinism in Deterministic Chaos.Roger Jones - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:537-549.
Are generic predictions enough?Alexander Rosenberg - 1989 - Erkenntnis 30 (1-2):43 - 68.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-02

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references