Korsgaard and Non-Sentient Life

Between the Species 17 (1) (2014)
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Abstract

Christine Korsgaard argues for the moral status of animals and our obligations to them. She grounds this obligation on the notion that we share a common identity, our animal nature, with them and that animal pain represents a public reason that binds us; nevertheless, her distinctive attempt to enlist Kantian arguments to account for our obligations to animals has a startling implication that she fails to adequately consider: that we have direct duties to plants as well

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Gregory Bock
University of Texas At Tyler

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References found in this work

The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
Kant on duties regarding nonrational nature.Onora O'Neill - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):211–228.
Duties to animals: The failure of Kant's moral theory.J. Skidmore - 2001 - Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4):541-559.

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