The Moral and Political Philosophy of Plato's "Laws"

Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley (1990)
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Abstract

Although it is Plato's last and longest dialogue, the Laws has been badly neglected by philosophers. In this dissertation, I try to remedy some of this neglect by making a careful examination of the moral and political philosophy of the Laws. ;I begin by considering the basic features of the Laws's moral philosophy; the nature of the four virtues, the relations among them , the relation between virtue and happiness and Plato's division of goods. I argue that Plato has abandoned his earlier claim that knowledge is necessary for virtue and consider some of the implications of this shift. ;In the field of moral psychology, I concentrate on the role of pleasure in individual choice and on Plato's analysis of akrasia. With regard to pleasure, I argue that although Plato accepts the claim that each individual is willing only to perform the most pleasant action available to him, he is not committed to any form of psychological hedonism. With regard to akratic action, I argue that the Laws provides a new analysis of this phenomenon. The Republic explains akratic action by partitioning the soul into three agent-like parts. I outline the difficulties of the Republic's account and argue that the Law's new analysis of akratic action is based on a revised moral psychology that does not involve a partitioning of the soul. ;In the field of political philosophy, I argue that Plato in the Laws is committed to a consequentialist account of social justice and, in particular, is committed to the claim that the ultimate end of every just law and social institution is the maximization of happiness. Taking this as a basis, I proceed to consider two related issues. First, I argue that this conception of justice is derived from Plato's view of practical rationality and that Plato believes that practical rationality, for both individuals and groups, requires maximizing the good. Second, I analyze Plato's claim that law should persuade rather than compel free citizens and consider how this claim can be justified in terms of the goal of maximizing happiness.

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Chris Bobonich
Stanford University

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