Chrysippus' Theory of Causes

In Katerina Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX


ABSTRACT: A systematic reconstruction of Chrysippus’ theory of causes, grounded on the Stoic tenets that causes are bodies, that they are relative, and that all causation can ultimately be traced back to the one ‘active principle’ which pervades all things. I argue that Chrysippus neither developed a finished taxonomy of causes, nor intended to do so, and that he did not have a set of technical terms for mutually exclusive classes of causes. Rather, the various adjectives which he used for causes had the function of describing or explaining particular features of certain causes in particular philosophical contexts. I challenge the sometimes assumed close connection of Chrysippus’ notion of causation with explanation. I show that the standard view that the distinction between proximate and auxiliary causes and perfect and principal causes corresponds to the distinction between internal and external determining factors is not born out by the evidence, and argue that causes of the two types were not thought to co-operate, but rather conceived of as alternatives.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Early Stoic Determinism.Susanne Bobzien - 2005 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):489-516.
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy.Susanne Bobzien - 1998 - , GB: Oxford University Press.
Did Epicurus discover the Free-Will Problem?Susanne Bobzien - 2000 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19:287-337.
Chrysippus Confronts the Liar: The Case for Stoic Cassationism.Michael Papazian - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):197-214.
Chrysippus' Modal Logic and Its Relation to Philo and Diodorus.Susanne Bobzien - 1993 - In K. Doering & Th Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stoiker. Franz Steiner. pp. 63--84.
Free will and the burden of proof.William Lycan - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 107-122.
Chrysippus and the epistemic theory of vagueness.Susanne Bobzien - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.


Added to PP

979 (#7,983)

6 months
105 (#10,716)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Susanne Bobzien
Oxford University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references