Abstract

One common way of framing the recent history of definitional theories of art has it that Wittgensteinian challenges to the definitional project were not successful in establishing the impossibility of a successful definition, but they were successful in providing limits on the kinds of theories that can work. A key part of this story concerns Morris Weitz’s argument that “art” is indefinable because art is – as he calls it – an “open concept”. The argument has since been refuted by definitional theories that account for art’s openness. Doing so, in fact, has become something of a motivation for and a requirement of subsequent theories. I argue here, however, first that accepting Weitz’s premise that art is open has led to an unfortunate pessimism about providing thoroughly informative definitional theories, and second that such pessimism is unwarranted. Art is not, in fact, open in the way Weitz suggests. Recognizing this should enable us to once again seek more informative definitional theories.