Logical foundations of probability (1950)
Abstract
The term 'explicatum' has been suggested by the following two usages. Kant calls a judgment explicative if the predicate is obtained by analysis, of the subject. Husserl, in speaking about the synthesis of identification between a confused, nonarticulated sense and a subsequently intended distinct, articulated sense, calls the latter the 'Explikat' of the former. (For both uses see Dictionary Of Philosophy [1942], ed. D. Runes, p. 105). What I mean by 'explicandum' and 'explicatum' is to some extent similar to what C. H. Langford calls 'analysandum' and 'analysans': "the analysis then states an appropriate relation of equivalence between the analysandum and the analysans" ("The notion of analysis in Moore's philosophy", in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore [1943], ed. P. A. Schilpp, pp. 321-42; see p. 323); he says that the motive of an analysis "is usually that of supplanting a relatively vague idea by a more precise one" (ibid., p. 329)