Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284 (2021)

Authors
Olle Blomberg
University of Gothenburg
Abstract
According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action. It does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher-order interlocking intentions.
Keywords group identification  intentional cooperation  joint commitment  joint intentional cooperative action  shared cooperative intention  team reasoning
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Reprint years 2020, 2021
DOI 10.1111/mila.12274
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