Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284 (2021)
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Abstract |
According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action. It does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher-order interlocking intentions.
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Keywords | group identification intentional cooperation joint commitment joint intentional cooperative action shared cooperative intention team reasoning |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2020, 2021 |
DOI | 10.1111/mila.12274 |
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References found in this work BETA
Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory.Michael Bacharach - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
What We Ought to Do: The Decisions and Duties of Non-Agential Groups.Olle Blomberg - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):101-116.
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