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Finessing the Bored Monkey Problem
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 24 (1):1-2 (2020)
Abstract
This is a response to Ian Phillips and Jorge Morales, "The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2020Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Does the prefrontal cortex play an essential role in consciousness? Insights from intracranial electrical stimulation of the human brain.Omri Raccah, Ned Block & Kieran C. R. Fox - 2021 - Journal of Neuroscience 1 (41):2076-2087.
The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?Irem Duman, Isabell Sophia Ehmann, Alicia Ronnie Gonsalves, Zeynep Gültekin, Jonathan Van den Berckt & Cees van Leeuwen - 2022 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 16:861517.
Experiencing without knowing? Empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access.Yoni Zion Amir, Yaniv Assaf, Yossi Yovel & Liad Mudrik - 2023 - Cognition 238 (C):105529.
References found in this work
What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It.Ned Block - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (12):1003-1013.
The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms.Ian B. Phillips & Jorge Morales - 2020 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences:1-2.
Is the frontal lobe involved in conscious perception?Shervin Safavi, Vishal Kapoor, Nikos K. Logothetis & Theofanis I. Panagiotaropoulos - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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