Feelings and Emotional Evaluation

Dissertation, Stanford University (2004)

This dissertation argues that emotions are best seen as a form of evaluation in which feelings play a central role. These "felt evaluations" should not be construed as beliefs, and, precisely because they are felt, they serve a distinctive and crucial role in our mental lives. In contrast, many philosophers who take emotions to be evaluative beliefs have argued that feelings are at best only a necessary accompaniment, serving to distinguish emotional from unemotional beliefs, while contributing next to nothing to the nature of the evaluation, nor its motivational or rationalizing role. ;This line of thought is supported by an unsatisfactory understanding of emotional feelings first proposed by William James. While the phenomenological observations made by James are compelling, his contention that emotions are nothing more than the experience of physiological processes in the body seems inadequate. This picture of emotional feelings suggests that the intentional objects of emotional responses are not the object or person we fear, or at whom we are angry, but rather the goings-on in our body while we are afraid or angry. Moreover, it is hard to see how the experience of physiological processes could be held accountable to the sorts of normative constraints to which we think emotions are usually subject. Thus these philosophers contend that emotions are evaluative judgments. ;I reject these arguments, arguing that a view taking seriously James' insights can answer such objections. Drawing upon certain perceptual analogies, particularly feelings such as the feeling of the weight of an object in ones hand, I argue that feelings of physiological processes can, when combined or "fused" with appropriate concepts, produce feelings with different intentional objects and phenomenal character. For emotions, these concepts are the evaluative ones we typically associate with fear, embarrassment, grief, and the like. I argue that feeling these evaluative contents is a form of evaluation that is particularly well suited to impressing upon us, and constituting, the importance or significance of a person, object, or situation. Emotions, as felt evaluations, thus play a vital role in our mental lives, one distinct from the role played by evaluative beliefs
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Emotional Feelings.Tim Bloser - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (2):179 - 205.
In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna - 2014 - In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 15-31.
The Content of Emotional Thoughts.Tim Bloser - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):219-243.
Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.Peter Goldie - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
Emotion: Something More Than Feelings.Allyson Lee Robichaud - 1997 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Are Emotions Feelings?Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
Emotion, Object and Justification.Bonnelle Lewis Strickling - 1984 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
What is an Emotion in the Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion?Rainer Reisenzein - forthcoming - In F. Paglieri, M. Tummolini, F. Falcone & M. Miceli (eds.), The goals of cognition: Essays in honor of Cristiano Castelfranchi. College Publications.
Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (6):602-626.
Goldie's Puzzling Two Feelings:'Bodily Feeling 'and'Feeling Toward '.Sunny Yang - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (3):317-327.
What Feelings Can't Do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
Affect Programs and Feelings.Achim Stephan - 2009 - Mind and Matter 7 (2):163-176.


Added to PP index

Total views

Recent downloads (6 months)

How can I increase my downloads?


Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes