Bending and Stretching the Definition of Lying

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):247-256 (2020)
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Abstract

One of the recent trends in dealing with the concept of lying has been to argue that the idea that one needs to deceive someone in order to lie has been accepted too hastily. In Lying and Insincerity Stokke shares this opinion and proposes a definition of lying based on the notion of common ground that includes bald-faced lies. Additionally, he rejects the idea that lying can be accomplished with pragmatic means such as conversational implicatures and proposes a formal distinction between lying and misleading. In this review, I present the content of Stokke’s book and critically discuss the two points mentioned above.

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