Truth and a Priori Possibility: Egan’s Charge Against Quasi Realism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213 (2009)
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Abstract

In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and give further consideration to the correct way to think about our own fallibility

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Simon Blackburn
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Oxford,: Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright.
Thinking how to live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.

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