Philosophy of Science 56 (3):438-462 (1989)

Abstract
An inference to a new explanation may be both logically non-ampliative and epistemically ampliative. Included among the premises of the latter form is the explanadum--a unique premise which is capable of embodying what we do not know about the matter in question, as well as legitimate aspects of what we do know. This double status points to a resolution of the Meno paradox. Ampliative inference of this sort, it is argued, has much in common with Nickles' idea of discoverability and, together with the mapping and correction procedures (briefly summarized) required for such inference, may suggest a broadening of the concept of justification which would incorporate much of what has been defended in theories of discovery
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DOI 10.1086/289500
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References found in this work BETA

The Inference to the Best Explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
Patterns of Discovery.Norwood R. Hanson, A. D. Ritchie & Henryk Mehlberg - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (40):346-349.
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.Imre Lakatos - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-196.
Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?Herbert A. Simon - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (4):471-480.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Science Textbooks Treat Scientific Method: A Philosopher's Perspective.James Blachowicz - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):303--344.
Discovery Logics.Thomas Nickles - 1990 - Philosophica 45 (1):7-32.
Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism.Eric Barnes - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410.

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Abductive Knowledge and Holmesian Inference.Alexander Bird - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--31.
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Ampliative Abduction.James Blachowicz - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):141 – 157.

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