A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's Sophist

Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24 (2003)
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Abstract

I argue that in Plato's _Sophist, the account of true and false statement which emerges within the discussion of not being and falsehood neither entails nor outwardly suggests any of the traditional characterizations of a correspondence "theory" of truth. On the contrary, what emerges is a minimalistic "conception" of truth which requires neither positing the existence of facts nor formulating an explanatory definition of truth. I make comparisons with Aristotle's discussion of truth in the _Categories and _De Interpretatione, and I offer reasons why one should not expect to find the emergence of a "theory" of truth in the _Sophist

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Blake Hestir
Texas Christian University

Citations of this work

A Puzzle About 'because'.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Logique Et Analyse 53.
Das Meisterargument in Platons Euthyphron.Benjamin Schnieder - 2015 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 18 (1):227-254.
Conceptions of Truth in Plato’s Sophist.Michail Peramatzis - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (3):333-378.

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