Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates

In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 1–20 (2015)
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Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as a problem for non-cognitivists. The last decades have seen a number of developments of internalist positions and arguments for and against internalism. This chapter provides a structured overview of the more important themes, including the development of new forms of conditional internalism, deferred internalism, and non-constitutional internalism, as well as the emergence of empirically-based arguments and new forms of a posteriori internalism.



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Author Profiles

Gunnar Björnsson
Stockholm University
Ragnar Francén
University of Gothenburg
John Eriksson
University of Gothenburg
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Citations of this work

The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic.Alex King - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):632-663.
Ethical Judgment and Motivation.David Faraci & Tristram McPherson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 308-323.
True Grit and the Positivity of Faith.Finlay Malcolm & Michael Scott - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (1):(A1)5-32.
Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.
Moral and Moorean Incoherencies.Andrés Soria-Ruiz & Nils Franzén - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.

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