Abstract

In its broadest sense, this work is a study of the relationship between logic and society. Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy, Harold Garfinkel's program of ethnomethodology, and Harvey Sacks' analysis of ordinary talk are radical exceptions to conventional logic in respect to understanding the origin of logic as social. In their works, logic is no longer viewed as an a priori order of thinking but, rather, as the "indexical" structure of social action. In a traditional sense, then, this study is neither a work on logic nor on the sociology of knowledge. Nor is it a study of logic as "transcendental" rules for making correct inferences or a general theory of relations which treat logic as socially conditioned . Rather, logic as socially consituted is understood here as: the implicit order of human deeds; a form of talk; and an explication of the preceding two in respect to their in situ production. Logic, then, as a social deed will be systematically pursued within this larger tripartite framework. Deeds as various as the making of Plato's text, the deep grammatical construction of Newtonian physics, iconographic paintings as the explication of the intersubjective logic of space, and public suicide as a conversational/situational production will be analyzed as socio-logical enactments. I have necessarily chosen phenomena as diverse and rich as these in order to emphasize the variety of occasions on which one can, at least momentarily, see how and in which order logic and social relationships merge