All swamping, no problem

Analysis 80 (2):205-211 (2020)
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The swamping problem is to explain why knowledge is epistemically better than true belief despite being no more true, if truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. But Carter and Jarvis argue that the swamping thesis at the heart of the problem ‘is problematic whether or not one thinks that truth is the sole epistemic good’. I offer a counterexample to this claim, in the form of a theory of epistemic value for which the swamping thesis is not problematic: evidence monism. Then I argue that another kind of response to the swamping problem given by Sylvan 2018 does not escape the problem unscathed, because it is not only instrumentalism that gives rise to the swamping problem. The upshot is that, given a standard account of fundamental value, the swamping problem favours evidence monism over truth monism.



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Joseph Bjelde
Humboldt-University, Berlin

Citations of this work

The value of knowledge.Duncan Pritchard, J. Adam Carter & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The value of knowledge.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & John Turri - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The value of knowledge.Carter J. Adam, Pritchard Duncan & Turri John - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Anything but the truth.Joseph Bjelde - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):535-549.

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References found in this work

Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.

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