Anything but the truth

Synthese 199 (1-2):535-549 (2020)
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Abstract

Fundamental epistemic values are values that best explain some epistemic evaluations. But there are, I argue, no epistemic evaluations which are best explained by positing truth as an epistemic value. So truth is not a fundamental epistemic value.

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Joseph Bjelde
Humboldt-University, Berlin

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References found in this work

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.

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