Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action

New York: Cambridge University Press (1989)
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Abstract

From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behaviour, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the scepticism of many philosophers who have argued that 'free will' is impossible under 'scientific determinism'. This scepticism is best overcome, according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavourial events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature.

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Author's Profile

John Bishop
University of Auckland

Citations of this work

What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):101-26.
The contours of control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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